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J1mc 6th, 1962. At ten o'clock in the morning, Prcstdcnt.John F. K(•nncdy spoke to
the graduating class of the United St,1tcs Military A:adl·my. Krnucdy opened by
noting the pride he felt in being part of the Vilest Poini trudition and, with ll, the
pride in bein.g a citizen of the United States of Arnerica. He then announct'd his
decision, as commander in chief, to remit all confinernents and other cadet punishments. S,irely, at kast a fow cadets no longer cared what llwir president said
that morning. Indeed, JFK joked that Superintendent \A/illiam C. vVestmordand
must have been slightly pained to hear this news given that one cadet, who
Kennedy predicted would someday head the US Army, had just ,vatched eight
months' worth of punishment miraculously expunged from his record.
The presidenl then turned more serious, though certainly no less inspiring. He
asked cadets to rc:.ilizc how much America depended on them, how their responsibilities v,ould require a "versatility and an adapt:1bility never before rcq uired in
either war or in peace." Kennedy also spoke of a new type of war, "nc,,v in its intensity, yet ancient in its origin---war by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins,
war by ambush instead of by comhat; by infiltration, instead of aggression, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him."
Kennedy acknowledged the difficulties ahead, but in 1962 little seemed
outside the influence of American power. Moreover, the young president told
cadets they had one satisfaction, however difficult futu.rc days m.ay be: "Vvhcn
asked by any American what you are doing for your country, no one's answer,.,vill
be dearer than your own. vVest Point ... was built to produce officers committed
to the defense of their country, leaders who understand the great stakes which
,ire involved, leoders who cau be entrusted with the heavy responsibility whkh
modern weapons and the fight for freedom entail, leaders who can inspire the
same sense of obligation to duty which you bring to it:'' 1
It wot1 ld he nine years before another American president spoke to the Corps
of Cadets in the spring of their graduating year. 'Those nine years would see near
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unimaginable turmoil at home and abroad. A pre:;ident and his brotherwould he
assassinated, as would the most cloquenl and inspirational of civil rights leaders.

'111c war in Vietnam would expose the incapacity of American military leaders to
bring about a social revolution aimed ar tnmsforming foreign political structtl(es
and cultural traditions. Antiwar protests and race riots, raging dcross the United
States, ,vould unmask soci;,I divisions at home. It was, to he certain,
011s

.:i
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decade.

Nine long years after Kennedy's commencement address, Rich;ird M. Nixon

arrived at \Vest Poiut to offer his own remarks to ;i new crop of soon-to-be army
lie1itenants. Nixon spoke of the long and bitter ~truggle in Vil'tnam, and even

as US troops vvcre then withdrawing from that war--torn country, he noted how
Arncric.rns had ''stood behind their commitn:1ent to the people of South Vietnam

in the face of great temptations to turn aside." While the president saw hope for
a new era of world peace, none of this, he said, was a cause for euphoria, "The
harvest-time of peace is not yet," the president somberly declared,
Nixon told the cadets they could be proud of their country's power and proud
of their o,vn uniforms, yet admitted it was no sccrd that the "disdpline, intt:grity,
patriotism, self-sacrifice, which are the very lifeblood oian effective armed force
and which the Corps represents, could no longer he taken for grar:ted in the
Army in which you would serve. lhe symptoms of trouble were plain enough,"
Nixon said, "from drug abuse to insubordination:'
Compared to Kennedy's ,1ddress 1 Nixon's speech was solemn, evrn ominous. Clearly, the world had changed over the previous decade. So, too, it
seemed how Americans viewed themsdvcs at the most basic of levels. Was it
trne 1 as President Nixon suggested, that the United States waf; still the "keystone of peace"? Could cadets still be proud of their cour,try's power and of
tbcir mvn uniforms? Did the a(aderny's ideah: of duty and honor and uiuntry
still ring trne:::
Both speeches, each one in a sern,c bookending the Vietnam conflkt,
suggested how a decade's worth of war had reshaped presidentL1l 11eu·ralives

on the limits of Ameriecm powt•r, the role of wartime dissent, and whether
the United States still had a unique role to play in global affairs. Nixon's
depiction of cadets growing up in "stormy times" seem eel a far cry from lhc
soaring rhetoric of Rennedy's Camelot. 3 ln fact, by 1975, most· Amt'ricans
agreed ·with the tempestuous im~1gery Nixon had employed at \tvl'St Point
only four years earlier. One C;1thnlic journai decried, "There's a lot of'biood
on American hands/' wli iJe the Washington Post reported that Vietm1n had
"left a r;:i_ncid after-taste," so rnuch so that: 72 percent of polled Amerk,1ns
reg,mh,d Vktnam as a "dark moment" in United States history:1 Had vis.ions
of American powc·r (;rnd possibilities) ;,broad changed that much betw\·n1
the tYvo presJde:nci<;;:s;}

Introduction

Jn truth1 even before Nixon's resignation from office, Americans dready
were questioning what the Vietnam experience meant to the nation. 'Writing
in 1970, former National Security Council staffc:r Chester L. Cooper argt1ed
that the "thoughtful American is still groping for reasons, explanations, assurances:'' The fall of Saigon in April 1975 proved especially shocking. Few
could argue that with South Vtetnam's collapse1 the United States had not
suffered an ignominious defeat in Southeast Asia. Still, Americans searched
for answers. One senior military officer writing a postmortem on Vielnam
hoped to "comprehend what has appeared to be an incomprehensible war:'
From discrediting military service to undermining Americans' faith in their
government, the war had exacted a heavy price on a once proud and seifconfident nation. 6
]be postwar challenge, then, became one of crafting a historical narrative that
many, if not most, Americans could find palatable. Jn the process, tough questions needed tackling. If the United States had somehow changed between the
Kennedy and Nixon prcsidencies1what did that mean for US presence abroad:'
Was the nation in decline? Its foreign policy bankrupt? Perhaps rnost importantly1 was it possible to re-envision the Vietnam \Var as a noble cause in which
the American armed forces had actually won the war, only to have it lost at home
by those lacking the will to see a hard-fought conflict through to its rightful
conclusion?7
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Figure 1

STORMY TIMES. President Nixon reviewing W,•st Point cadets at a United
States Military Academy parade ceremony, 29 May 197 L (\NHPO Master File
#6423, RNL)

For those seeking answers el1plairnng how the United States Inst it~ firsl major
oversea,: war, the 19M? ·Tet offrnsive increct:-ingly se!-'.med an obvi01.;s tippjng
point. After a year of optimistic reports cmanaling fronl the 'Nhite House and
li1<.· US milita,7 hcii<lquartcrs in S,iigon--Gvncral VVilli;1m C. "\Vcstrnordand
described 19()7 as a year cf agn:at progn~s.•:t--surprise cnc1ny ~1.ttacks ranged
:Krns,; dw enlircry of SoutL Vietnam in lat,.· January and car,y Febrnary." 'Ihe
physical destruction wrought nn South Vietname,;e socit'ly 'NJS immense. 'l he
psychological trauma to A1nericans irnmeasu!·ahle. Senior US pulicyrnakers
expressed "grave doubts" at,oul any further progress being made in the war
efforl 1 while corrcsponcknts opined that the "scope, the intensity and the lcnadous thrnsl of the Communist attacks dec1dy c:iught a supposedly alerted allied
command badl)r off balance.'' Juurnalist David. Halberstam recalled that for tbe
l\1nerican public, "the Tet offensive wa'; .=t ntde awakt'ning to the toughness and
resilience nf the ,·ncrny, and a televisi<m preview of the long war ahe,td."''
Perhaps t,nsurprisingly, Arnericans focused on themsdve,, in the aftermath
,if 1(:•,, despite the dcvasUtion ,md soci;,l upheaval suffered by their South
Vietnamese allies. Ambassador Ellsworth Bm1kcr reported in mid-February of
U1e more lhan 4Sl\000 refugees, the 48,,000 homes. d1:stroyed, and the civilian
drnths numbering ;n the thous;1nds. Still, Ame:·ica.ns turned inward. News ediqmte ~irnply, fr1uncl a more compelling story to he: told in what appeared to
he a monumc,nlal failure in US leadership. 1111.1s1 '171c w;r// Street Joi.ma! could
conclude in l<itC I7cbruary that lhc ';Am,:rican people should be gc1ting ready lo
accept,, if they h,1ven't already1 the prospect that the wbok Vietnam dForl may

be doon1ed:110
It took ,.mly :1 f;_,w :-;hon steps to begin searching for someone to shoulder
r. ::,pm,sihility for such a ,.:olos:,Jl mis!ake. Tct demanded a scapegoat. And as
/ flVSHh.'CK
I rt:por i:.en,
I
"r·r·1'1
'
' tl.,y on 11);~nn ,vas tl1c con1-"1.\.
_ .11c ug1.1rc
1):1osl . .:onvcn1cn
mander on the spot, \Nilliam (~hiid, \;Vc::;tmon,!Jnd.'' lfthc war was indeed mired
in :,Ltlcmatc (onvorse) 1 then atle;i~;t one colurnnist argued it was time "to send a
'' ,rnrn.,ndcr t,) Vietnam ·who is capable of plotting a winning str;itegy or, if there
I'-- r"• ~11,.h thing, ·who is cap;ibk of telling tlic President so.' 11
blame hH ,.i rnjs,:arri,.,d fot·cign ,.var---a war so differcni from Lhc
,..,n. hving adverliscd by senio, US officids ---cut to deeper qu_-,stions about
'\Pi· r ·, •" role in Southe:isL Asia. No donbl V[csirnorel:rnd spoke for mz,ny
w,!it:if\- offiu,rs when h(• argL•ed H,,nci 118.d suffered a rnajor military defeJt
in
1968. But 1vas 'Tct truly an _AD1crican victory~) Jf soj ~Nhy ,vas the llS
co111:r1anding g,_'.11e1,d in Vktnarn rqvJrtcdly ;1slrn:g fc,r more than 200,000
j
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finally lay within the allies' grnsp?' 1 Or had the United Stales been dealt a
caListrophic blow? If American military commanders had "gravely Lmdere~Li
mated the capacity of the enemy," w.:1s it possible the war in Vietnam was now
"unwirmable"? Few senior kadcrs, either in v\Tashington or in Saigon, possessed satisfactory answers to any of these que~tious dominating the pllhlic
discourse at home in mi<l-19ML 11
TheAmerica11-centric focus of these inquiries tended to push the Vict11amcse,
both allies and enemy, into the background. Yet leaders in Hanoi and Saigon

equJ.!ly struggled lo find meaning from the battJeficlds of 1968. Even if the communists had not intended to drive the foreign occupiers out ofSollth Vietnam,
their goal of defeating the Americans· "aggressive will" remained difficult to
c1ssess. 11 Surely, US newspapers attested to widespread dlscontcnl in American
cities. But would that popular disc1 tiC'ction transbte into policy change? 'While
American generals might complain that ''you could have rnarched on Hanoi and
[the media] wouid h2,vc found some way to poor mouth you on it," such grip·

ing did not necessarily mean the United States was on the verge of withdrawing
from Southeast Asia. 1'
Yet within the first year of Rkh:ud M. Nixon's presidency, it became dear
Lo Hanoi, :rnd to the rest of the world, that lhc United States was, in fact, leaving South Vietnam. ff few Americans considered Vietnamese perspectives in th,2

aftermath of Tet, there seemed little doubt of the United States' inability to compel Hanoi into renouncing its aims of independence and national reunification.
Slowly came the realization that the long war in Asia might not be won. Tct may

have been "the most disaslrous defeat North Vietnam sufl:~~red in the iong war,"
but inexplicably it didn't seem to mattcr. 16 rnic new type of war about ,vhich
President Kennedy warned seemingly had gotten the best of US soldiers and
their civilian masters,
And thus began a decades' long search for answers, a relentless pursuit of the
"truth" rivaling Old Tirnnder Ahab's quest for his white whale, In fact, postwar

debates at times rivaled the contentiousness of the war itself. Even core lluestions remain disputed. \A/ho won? v\Tho should be blamed if the United States
did lose? Did defeat in Vietnam mean the Umtcd States no longer served as the
guarantor of democratic liberalism across the globe? 1"
ln the war's aftermath, the paucity of concrete answers seemed only to
heighten Americans' angst over what reJ.lly happened in Vietnam, 1hus, some
began to seek clarity by asking new questions; in truth, counterfactuals resting
more on hope than hi:,torical evidence. VVhat if~ in the afrermath of Tet, a new
l'unerican general assumed comm::md in Vietnam and, with a new strategy and
determined leadership, had turned arm.;nd the war effort? Might it he possible
that feckless civilian policyrnakers began to withdraw from a war just as it was
being won?
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Searching fcff a "Better War"
Certainly, contemporary media portrayals of General Creighton .Abrams
endorsed such a proposition. Just two days after President Lyndon B. Johnson
designated Abrams as the new commander ofAmerican forces ill South Vietnam,

11ie Christian Science Monitor declared in mid-April 1968 that the United States
had regained "strategic momentum on battlefieid:" 'i."1estmorcland's deputy, pielured squintii~g with a stern look, had not yet officially taken over the war effort,
yet miraculously had already turned it around.ts
Journalists gushed over this "general with a flair." Newspaper readers learned
of Abrams's daring exploits as a v\Torld War II tank commander in Patton's army,
of his "Spartanly simple" approach, and of his penchant for chewing black cigars.
(Had not Ulysses S. Grant similarly smoked cigars while saving the Union from
disaster?) Abrams was "tough, aggressive, dynamic, spectacular." 19 Even after Tet,
reporters took an optimistic tone when describing the new commander of the

US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (i\1ACV). vVhereas his \!\Test Point
classmate \Vestmoreland looked the part of an aloof, crisp, professional soldier,
Abrams impressed with his "candor, humor, self-effacement and common-sense
skepticism:' Moreover, in the "rumpled and somewhat burly Abrams," correspondents saw the "possibility of a significant change" in military strategy. 20
Thus, scaffolding v,as already being emplaced for construction of a myth that
would endure for decades_
Abrams, in short, would fight a "better war." 111e story appealed in no small
part because of its very simplicity. Despite setbacks in Vietnam and a growing
antiwar movement at home, a new general with a better strategy had taken the
reins and, through sheer wili, had forced the allies back onto the path toward
victory.

Abmms's herculean teat mattered because American leaders still depicted the
war in Vietnam as a morally righteous crusade, National security advisor Henry
Kissinger recalled "the overriding issue was how to keep faith with the tens of millions who, in reliance on American assurances, had tied their destiny to ours:' 21
President Nixon argued in September 1969 that the United States could not "accept
a settlement that would arbitrarily dictate the political future of South Vietnam and
deny to the people ofSoutJ1 Vietnam the basic right to determine their own future
free from outside interference:' 22 For Abrams to lose the war militarily meant a loss
of American credibility abroad and, just as importantly, a loss of freedom for young
democratic Asians opposing the aggression of global communism.
The "better war" thL·sis also rested on an overly reductive interpretation of
American strategy under Abrams's predecessor. According to the storyline,
Westmordand's failures as a strategist obliged the allies to a wrongheJded

lntruductioll

approach that produced only a costly stah-mate. Concentrating solely on attrition of enemy forces, where body counts served as the gruesome metric of progress, Westmoreland had chosen and pursued a ''search-and-destroy" strategy
destined to fail. As the Tet offensive's implications became clearer, it seemed
obvious the MACY commander had been "strategically outmaneuverecL"' 3 How
else could it be possible the United States was failing to make progress against a
1hird World nation like North Vietnam? Only a mistaken strategy could explain
the "smoldering stalemate" that was Vietnam. Further, Vvestmoreland apparently
had renounced alternatiw strategies that would have more propedy focused
the allies on population security. 2'1 A clear-sighted Abrams, however, waitmg
patiently in the wings as MACV's deputy, reoriented the entire command soon
after taking charge. A change in strategy had broken the stalemate.
For Americans uncomfortable with the idea of a tic, especially on the battlefield, the "better war" narrative prowd instantly appealing. 'With the war costing
nearly $2.5 billion a month, and Americans being killed at an approximate rak
of 300 per week, Abrams's ascendance to command promised a reinvigorated
strategic approach---perhaps even victory. 25 Even if more astute observers realized that the Nixon administration no longer sought a strictly military solution
in Vietnam, Abrams could at least ,vm an "honorable peace," of which senior
officers had spoken as early as 1967. American commanders might not be able
to deliver an unconditional surrender, as had their forebearcrs in World War II.
But they could at least translate the moral commitment to South Vietnam into a
tangible outcome that maintained the' nation's honor and prestige. 26
In short, the "better war" premise offered hope at a time when Americans were
coming to the uncomfortable realization that the very definition of victory in
war might be changing, and not for the better. Critics still maintained the United
States was mired in an unwinnable war. The seeming reverses wrought by the
Tet offensive--coupled with increasing social and political turmoil at home-shook the confidence of policy elite and general public alikeY Yet Abrams and
his more enlighten"d approach to military strategy offered ltmericans a chance
to redeem themselves on the battlefields of South Vietnam. lf military victory lay
out of reach, the general could nevertheless withdraw from Vietnam in an honorable fashion. The communists would not steal a win in the global contest of
good versus evil. The South Vietnamese would remain free. And the Americans
could remain proud of fighting for a noble c8use, 28
Hence, the "better war" myth, first constructed by journalists belicving
they saw a major change with the ascendancy of Creighton Ahrams to Iv1ACV
command 1 became a functional device for later pundits and policymakers. For
instance1 the general's reputation rose dramatically after the 2003 US invasion
oflraq. With the war there unraveling ,ls early as 20041 analysts reached back to

WITHDRAWAL

Vietnam for "lessons" on defeating a committed insurgency. US Army officers
penned articles in professional journals like Military Review extolling the virtues
of Abrams1 while the RAND Corporation issued studies contending the general's "understanding of the war was clearly different from his predecessor's." 29
Consequently, with lrag on the brink of collapse in 2006, history seemed to be
repeating itself. General David Petraeus, just like Abrams, took charge of a losing war at a critical moment and1 with a new and enlightened strategy, snatched
victory from the jaws of defeat. A "better war" had once more saved the nation
from humiliating <lcfoat. 30

Beyond the Myth
Though the Abrams era has become a convenient historical case study for more
present-minded analysts, a reassessment of the Vietnam ii\Tar's later years presents a far less triumphal narrative. 'l11us, the purpose of this work is to reevaluate
the "better war" thesis and1 more broadly, the ofren overlooked period of the
American war in Vietnam bchveen 1968 and 1972. Niuch of the new scholarship
within the United Stales continues to focus on the inner workings of the Nixon
White House (thanks lo the release of the president's Oval Office tape recordings) or how the antiwar movement embodied the angst of the post-Vvorld \\Tar
II generation. 31 Additionally, new memoirs have expanded our knowledge of the
combat soldiers' experiences, fighting at sucb battles like "Hamburger Hill," or
of the discontent in the ranks that led to the "fragging'' of officers and senior
enlisted leaders. Yet the relationship between the US military leaders in South
Vietnam and the civilian policymakers in VVashington, DC, remains an understudied topic. 32
Withdrnwal1 therefore, intends to fill a gap within the existing literature by
concentrating on the senior US military command's prosecution of the politicalmilitary conflict in Victnam1 in a sense a continuation of Westmoreland'., Wiir.
Far from the conventional-minded officer who cared only for racking up enemy
body counts, I have argued previously, 'Westmoreland "developed a compn::hensive military strategy consistent with the president's larger political objectives."
In the process, the general "devised an operational plan that accorded well with
the complex realities of the Vietnamese rcvolutionarywar." 33
In conjtmction with the main arguments made in vVestmoreland!s lVirr, this
work challenges the long-standing, and overly reductive, proposition that
American strategy in Vietnam changed abruptly in mid-1968 from "search and
destroy" to "dear and hold,"" 1 Reassessing the historical record suggests the transition between vVcstmoreland and Abrams yielded no such categorkal breaks.
1hE' lure of Lhc '' b12ttcr war" narrative, however1 remains strong, "Orns, in his
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recent ·,;tudy of American generalship, journabt 'l11omas E, Ricks could argue
"there were more continuities between Westmor,:'.!and and Abrams than not/'
1.vhile still affirming that ''Abrams put aside Wcstmorcland's strategy of attrition:'
Counterinsurgency advocate John Nagl offl:red an equally cornradictory view.
Nag! maintained, "Abrams completely changed the emphasis of M_ACV strat
egy," only to state shortly thereafter that the genernl "was unable i:o change the
strategy of the U.S. Anny." 15 It seemed as if c:omesting the narrative ws1s just loo
bitter a pill. Myths, ofcoursc, have a way of enduring in the popular mindset.

A reassessment contesting these myths is long overdue. ltt its core_, then,
l¥it/zdrawal argw.,s that General Cri.-ighton Abrams, and the entire US mission
in South Vietnam, were unable to reverse, or even arrest, the downward trends
of a complicated Vietnamese w,u that by 1968 had turned into a political-military stalemate. Despite J new articulation of MACV strategy1 i\brams's \me
war" approach could not materially alter a war that i\mcrican political leaders
no longer saw as vital to US 1Mtional security or global dominance. In short,
the bloody stalemate in Vietnam persisted during the Ahrnms years. Moreover,
though the war expanded outside of South Vietnam's borders (in part hecause of
this stalernate), the Vietnamese conflict became tangential lo larger US national
security needs. Surely; Abrams adapted to these changing circumst;mces, But
the slight tactical alterations ultimately mattered littk. Once the i\Jixon White
House made the political decision to withdraw from Southeast Asia 1 MACV"s
military strategy was unable to change either the course or the outcome of a
decades' long Vietnam.esc civil war. 16
This work further argues that the "better war" thesis overextends reality. 'Ihc
myth's narrative assumes that military strategy crafted in Saigon could overcome political decisions made in vVashington. It could not. Even with over a
halfmillion US troops in Vietnam by 1968, continued fighting there seenied
unlikely to attain larger frireign poiic y objectives.'•" Abrams quite simply could
not save a war that at least some US political leaders already had decided was
lost--at least in the traditional military sensc--or was no longer worth fighting.
President Nixon might still believe in the domino theory, but groused that the
"real question is whether the i\mcricans give a damn anymore:' 18 After y;;:ars of
stalcmatt', policymakers in \,Vashington had finally grasped that furthering tl-ie
war in Vietnam was damaging, rather than bolstering, US c:redihility abroad.
Perhaps most importantly1 neither Abrams nor his predecessor vVcstmorcl:md
could answer underlying questions about Vietnamese national identity in the
modern era. In essence, the war h<1d always revolved arnund this fundamental
issuc----what did it mean to be Vietnamese in the aftermath of European colo,
nialism' If US military strategy could not transcend policymaking decisions in
\V;tshington, it possessed even less influence in the rm:11 countryside and mban
cities of Soutb Vietnam where this key question wo1.1ld be setth,d. TI1e contest
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over national identity remained central to determining the war's outcome, yet
.Amcrkans rnattered only in that many, if not most, Vietnamese saw outside
influence as inirnical to their cause. Surely, countless South Vietnamese, especially army officers, viewed US involvement as crucial to sustaining the Saigon
regime. Yet by the lak 1960s, even under the auspices of a new commander, the
Arnerican presence appeared as disruptive as it was necessary.

Reassessing the Final Yc<lfs
If violence remained an iutegral part ofMACV's approach in the years after Tct,
other consistencies marked the American experience in Vietnam during the
Abrams era. Thus, three themes thread their way through this work. First, political grand strategy fashioned in ·washington trumped military strategy concciwd
and implemented in South Vietnam. Stratcg)r, in truth, unfolds at different levels.
US Army doctrine in the late 1960s made dear delineations between "national
strategy" and "military strategY:' While the former comprised "the long-range
plan through which a nation applies its strength toward the attainment oJ:' its
objective," the latter directed the "development and use of the military meam;°'
to "further national strategy through tbc dirt'cl or indirect application of military
po..,ver.'}?, 9
:More recent explorations into d:ie topic have proposed that "grand strategy"
supplies the "intellectual an:hikcture that lends structurl' to foreign policy."" 0
Encompassing rnore than just military matters, grand strategy takes into account
::tll assets of national power and at1thority-----economic, diplomatic; social, and
even mor,,l aspects. 'lbus, :,s one specialist has observed,"' Milit;;ry strategy' and
'grand strategy' arc interrelated, hut arc by no means synorrymous:'+ 1
This argument plays a cruciaJ role ,vhen reassessing I.he United States' final
yettrs iu Vietnam. VVhilc General Akams held broad authority when crafting
military strategy inside South Vietnam, his seemingly unconventional "one war"
approach could not transcend political decisions being crafted in the White
House, Whether under Lyndon Johnson or Richard Nixon, military strategy
remained bounded by parametcn: set far from the batt]efickL
Secolld, Abrams could not balance a war that was unfolding along mnncrow; (and often competing) lines, Upon taking office, Nixon formublcd :1
wide-ranging grnnd strategy airned at achieving multiple gods--revcrsing the
"Americanization" of the war,. giving more priority to pacification, destroying
enemy sanctuaries, withdrawing US troop~ from Vietnam, .ind negotiating a
ccase---fir,_' and peace treaty v,itb HaEoi ~rnd Saigon.+:! Yd even before T✓ ixon·s
in,rnguration, Ahrams <1ck11owJ,,,dg;•d the chaJlengc was "lo orchestrak our
effort~ ;111d our resources 1,0 that our total goal GUJ be :1c:hicvt·d," The gener;.tl
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believed tbat all of his L'lsks had to be 1mdertakcn concurrently. To many critics,
Westmoreland had failed 1 in part, because of his sequrntial approach aimed at
defeating the enemy first before helping pacif\· and then build a stable South

Vietnamese nation. 41
But Almnns's "one war" approach, while conceptually sensible1 proved unrealistic in practice. The M.ACV commander could never find parity among the
opposing imperatives of US troop withdrawals1 negotiations ,vith Hanoi, the
policy of Victnamization1 and the necessity of fighting an ongoing war.+' If the
purpose of grand strategy was to "achieve equilibrium between means and ends/
Nixon had given his military chiefin Vietnam an unmanageable task. Even optimists enamored with Abrams conceded that one had to make "bopefol assump-tions" when assessing whether or not the general could fulfil! the presid,~nt';;
wishes.+5
"ll1is crafting of grand strategic objectives outside the capacity of the military
command in Vietnam speaks to the final theme in Withdrawal. 'Throughout, this
work explores the interrelationships between war and society in both the United
States and South Vietnam. If Abrams could not balance the war in Vietnam, ,1t
least some of that failure cou.ld he attributed to the influenn· of the Arnerkan
home front. Certainly, much care is nehled here1 for it is far too easy to blame the
antiwar m.ovcment or a liberal news medLl for failures at the grand strategic level.
Writing in early 19671 Arthur Schlesinger believed the "proposition that dis1-,ent
in America is losing the war in Vi<ctnarn is, on existing evidence, much less a
fact than an alibi:' 46 Still1 policy decisions and domestic matters held influence
over how Abrams (and his South Vietmunese allies) approached the conflid in
Southt:ast Asia.
Nixon and Kissinger1 for instance, both Lm1t·nted the pressures being exerted
by an impatient home front. 'll1e president, hoping to withdraw from Vietnam
while maintaining the nation's honor, complained of "this cancer eating at us
at home, eating at us abroad:' Kissinger equally railed against domestic grOL1ps
who were pressing the United States to "withdraw unilaterally and dump" South
Vietnamese president Nguyen Van Thicu. 17 Even the editor frir 1he Harford
Courant compared the war in late 1969 to a football game in which the United
States was ''winning 34-7 in the third quarter jL1st when the game may be called
and the other side declared the winncr:•-is
This interdependence between military strategy and the home front certainly
influenced what the White House and Abrams's headguarters deemed possible
as the United States began its slow departure from Vietnam. Less studied, how"
ever, has been the role of the South Vietnamese home front on the war's progress
and final outcome. In a struggle among the population (and for its support),
the South Vietnamese were always more than just passive actors. 4'1 1h10 political
elite in Saigon decided whether or not to accept recommendations emanating
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from the US Embassy. Local militia and security forces often determined military and political momentum in the countryside. And, of course, the people
themselves were the final arbiters in resolving the crucial question of their government's legitimacy. If lhc "United States was winning in the third quarter, it
seemed at times they were playing in a completely different stadium from their
South Vietnamese allies.
Thus, even for Americans, notions of victory and defeat ultimately depended
on local entities. Without question, most US military and civilian leaders in
Saigon understood that South Vietnam ·was "in the midst of a social and political
revolution." 50 1heyworried about sustaining popular will not only at home, but
also in the Vietnamese countryside, where war-weary inhabitants might concede
to communist demands and revoke their support for the 'Ihieu government. But
Americans' grasp of this revolutionary struggle reached only so deep. The complexities of the internal contest over national identity that crossed ethnk, cultural, and social boundaries too often eluded US war managers. Moreover, for
officers to consider their own limited influence remained a difficult proposition.
As one senior US general recalled, "It was like keeping a gyroscope spinning
on this thing. You have l:o put a little spin on it occasionally if it runs down and
wobbles:''' 1
Clearly, though, the Soutb Vietnamese proved much more than an inanimate
spinning top in need of American energy to keep upright. In this sense, exploring
the war's impact on both Vietnamese and American societies helps us reevaluate the successes and limitations of US milildry strategy during the Abrams era.
A more holistic approach contests the popular notion that the United States
won the war militarily only lo lose it politically. 1hough Nixon later would complain that "Vietnam was lost on tbe political front in the United States, not on
the battlefield in Southeast Asia," such verdicts tended to diminish the chaotic
revolutionary struggle among the Vietnamese. 51 Americans may have pursued
an effective and stable Saigon government "like the Holy Grail," but arguing
that dissent at home undermined US military accomplishments abroad misses
an import,mt point. 'Jhe intersections between governmental legitimacy and
political""militaryviolence in South Vietnam never evolved as neatly as President
Nixon might have hoped." 3
Moreover, if many Americans dissented against US foreign policy in
Southeast Asia, the South Vietnamese equally judged their government of South
Vietnam (GVN). Far from limp "puppets" represented in enemy propaganda,
the South Vietnamese---political leaders, urban elite, and rural farmers alikemade chokes that mightily influenced the course of the war. True, local leaders'
decisions often "exacerbated the social disorder already generated by the war:' 51
But so, too, did the presence of more than half a million foreign soldiers and
civilians. And whik contemporary An1ericans generally condemned the "sheer
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incapacity of the regime we hacked," ij 1troducing any form of"social revolution,"
as GVN leaders believed they were doing, was bound to be disruptive, In the

process, even a farmer's passive acceptance ofcoramunist influence in his village
proved to be a choice of great politicai import.

This larger appreciation for the rdationships bctwc,:n war and its affecied
societies entails reevaluating the evidence (or lack thereof) on which "better
war" narratives rest If Abrams had, in fact, succeeded in t'cfocusing "U.S. military strategy away from search and destrny toward population conlTo]/' then why
did this dramatic shift not lc,ld to substantial increases of support for the Saigon
government?' 6 v\Thy, in the aftermath of Tel, did ,1 batti:rd National Liberation
Front (NLF) --pejoratively dubbed the "Vietcong" or "VC" by the allies
continue to retain political influence in the South Vietmmese count1ysidc:> And
if Abrams spoke of a "new ball game," why did so much of the rural population
sec only continued sufforing and devastation from a war with sc,~mingly no end
in sight?s:

In the end, a seledivc use of the historical record, too often ignoring the South
Vietnamese voice, has helped craft a misleading story about a new, war-winning
strategy in the aftermath ofTet. Amor·e accurate portrayal, however, tells a difforcnt tak. No miraculous strategic transformations occurred in mid-1968.
J\.merican officers did not suddenly gain a newfound appreciation for the war's
political facets because of Abrams 's rise to command, 1he Saigon government
had not convinced the bulk of the rural population that it alone was the legitimate voice of the more than 17 million people living inside a war•tom country.
And no victory had been achieved in South Vietnam, only to have irresolute
American politicians, disloyal journ,tlists, and ,mpatriotir antiwar demonstrators sabotage the nation's last chance to achieve peace with honor in a long, yet
noble, war.' 8

\Var as Politics
Reassessing America's final years in Vidnam requires one final recognition. War
is not simply a military endeavor. Political objectives drive the decisions of policyrn<lkers, combatants, and even those civilians caught in the path of 1,var;' 9 Tel
surely demonstrated the incongruity between military operations and politi,:al
realities in both the United States and Vietn,un. But so, too, did post-1968 battles
like Hamburger Hill or the allied incursions into Camhodia and Laos. Success on
the battlefield rarely translated into political cachet for either Presidents Nixon
or 111ieu. Nor did these military operations encourage the South Vietnamese
people to fully throw their lot behind the Saigon government. Nixon surely
intended MACV's military operations Lo create political opportunities for the
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allies, such as increased leverage at the negotiating tabk. Yet the president and
his advisors (as well as contemporary military officers) visibly grasped the all
too temporary affects that military campaigns had in realizing the war's larger
political aims/' 0
StiU, Vietnam veterans took aim at their civilian masters after South Vietnam's
collapse. They railed against the "fuzzy-headed liberals" and the "great deal of
pressure from Washington ... just to turn tail and run:'oJ TI1ey blamed political leaders for unnecessary restrictions that undermined military effectiveness.
(\Vouldn't an unlimited air campaign and 8 call-up of the reserves., they asked,
have altered the course and outcome of the war?) And they impugned policymakers for stabbing them in the back. As one lieutenant general recalled, "We
had won the war after the Tct offensive and the mini-Tct, but we weren't permitted to follow it up and actually accomplish the total defeat." Civilian oversight
of the military, a constitutional imperative, seemed less important than winning
the war at all costs. 62
Veterans equally denounced the media for cultivating dissent at home, mis,,
representing military victories in Vietnam, and pressuring \Vashington politi-.
dans to end the war rcgardkss of the costs to national prestige and influe11<:e.
One officer protested the "irresponsible journalism" that rn:atc:d a "chaotic
image of the US 1cffort in Victnam." 63 Anotht,r believed th,· c1nnmunists had
used "our freed.om of the press to their advantage;' while yet another, writing in
Lits! 1969, believed the "Cassandras have succeeded in blinding tlH' victorious
warrior ·who cannot sec his enemy writhing on the floor in the aremt," Not to be
outdone, ,:ven President Nixon bemoaned how "our worst enemy seems to he

the press! "6·1
Of course, blaming political leaders or lhe media for "losing" the war in
Vietnam absolved military leaders of much wrongdoing, espt'.cially if under
Abrams a new strategy promised victory in Tet's aftermath. While convenient,
such claims rested on half-trnths at best Nixon and Kissinger, for example,
sought alternative policies not just for winning the war but also for ending it
honorably. Allegations of an oppositional media have been generally overblown. 65 Perhaps most importantly, to argue that political defeatism undercut
battlefield victories misinterprets a war that always was more political than military in its construct Such arguments also misconstrue the nature of modem war
itself~ which is always a political act first and foremosL
In truth, a collective search for blame became part of the long healing process after A1nerica's first lost war. 111e search reached far and wide. If victory was
betrayed in Vietnam, a host of villains couid be faulted--Congress, which in
Nixon's words had "proceeded to suatch defeat from the jaws of victory"; the
Soulh Vietnamese government for failing to embran) reforms endorsed by US
advisors; peaceniks like Jant Fonda and the misguided journalists who gave

them a national voice; even Abrams\ pn\cfoccssor for bungling the war dfort
and squandering public support. 66
From within this search for blame arose a reimagining of the Vietnam Vvar.
Perhaps the war had been won in Vietnam as Nixon had argued. Perhaps prolonging the conflict had, in fact, demonstrated the llation's credibility by directly
confronting communism, thus preventing other dominoes in Southeast .Asia
from falling. 67 Perhaps Ronald Reagan made sense when he claimed in August
1980 that "it's time we recognized that ours was, in truth, a noble cause:' As the
Republican presidential nominee declared, "V.fe dishonored the mcn:1ory of
50,000 young Americans who died in that cause when ,Ne give way to fedings of
guilt as ifwe were doing something shamcfoL" \Vas it possible the United States
had won the war in Vietnam? 68
Such rhetoric found a receptive audience, particularly among military offi•
cers. This reframing of the American experience in Vietnam also bolstered
claims that a major strategic shift after Tet had wrought significant gains. rn10t1gh
the "American people decided that Vietnam wasn't worth it/' tough fighting had
produced results, Nixon's decision to expand the war outside of South Vietnam's
borders, long an appeal from MACv; had disrupted enemy sanctuaries in
Cambodia and Laos and had a marked dFcct on Hanoi. 69 Even though some
argued there "was no intention-•--no objective --of defeating North Vietnam
militarily;" Abrams still had led the allies to victory. No doubt many officers
agreed with the argument, made in early 1970, that any "acceptance of dcfoat
would be a matter of our own decision and not a necessitY:' 70
These assertions, however congenial to veterans who sacrificed so much in
hopes oflcaving behind a stable and independent South Vietnam, also rest on
dubiOLis evidence. Reassessing America's final years in Vietnam presents a more
sober account of a struggle that left indelible scars on a number of societies. It
may be true, as one British officer remarked in 1967, that the military man "will
at times foel that his freedom of action is being unduly restricted by political considerations:·01 But war is a product of politics and military strategy only part of
any larger war. Several issues, ,vcll outside of i\1.ACV's scope, affected American
policy toward Vietnam-the political acumen of Hanoi's leaders, the military
effectiveness of the North Vietnamese and National Liberation Front armed
forces, progress in nation building made by the Saigon government, and thl!
changing global context of the larger Cold War. Q}lite simply, there were limits
to what mllitary force inside South Vietnam could accomplish. 72
1hc war surely aifoctcd more than just military officers coping with the limits
of US strategy. Some }unericans saw in the conduct of a losing war the making of
a national trauma, Nixon and Kissinger worried extensively about what Vietnam
was doing to US credibility abroad. Even before war's end, the president warned
that a precipitous withdrawal from Vietnam would "result in a collapse of
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confidence in American leadership not only in Asia but throughout the world."
Faced with the consequences, "inevitable remorse and divisive recrimination
would scar our spirit as a people.'' 73 "\,\Tith the last American troops departed
from Southeast Asia, Nixon's ,vords seemed prophetic. One critic lamented the
spectacle of defeat in Vietnam, calling it a "highly traumatic experience, since a
devaluation of national identity is a loss affecting the very quality oflife itself' If
maintaining US credibility had replaced a free and independent South Vietnam
as the war's ultimate political objective, it appeared the Americans had come up
short on both counts.7 4
Contentions of a war won militarily yet lost politically thus fall short of their
mark. The inseparable bonds between societies and the war they were fighting came into full view during the conflict's final years. Nowhere was this more
evident than in South Vietnam, an unsettled political community that buckled
under the combined weight of allied and enemy military action. 1f armed might
could buoy the Saigon government, it could not convince the people that military occupation would lead to their salvation. Nor could minor strategic alterations convert skeptics within the United States to believe their international
commitments to the Saigon regime were worth the continuing sacrifice.7'
More than forty years aft:er the fall of Saigon! it is time for those studying
the Vietnam War, especially Americans, to consider an uncomfortable proposition. Only the Vietnamese could resolve the deep political and social differences
around which their civil war revolved. Revisionist narratives of a war-winning
strategy undone by political imprudence simply don't hold up nnder closer
scrutiny. In the end, the best that American forces were able to achieve, wb ether
under William 'Westmoreland or Creighton Abrams, was a costly military stalemate, By 1973! the final US troops withdrew-from South Vietnam not as victors,
but as interlopers in a war that was never theirs to win or lose.

